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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

\YElL\ T. C.c\LLISTER,

Plaintiff and Respondent)

v.

Case No.

Lt·ry C. CALLISTER, Individually
and as Executrix of the Estate of
. \ lf'red Cyril Callister, Deceased,
Defendant and Appellant.

10013

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ST .:\.TE)IEXT OF KIND OF CASE
This was an action to set aside a release, stipulation,
and judgment (resulting from compromise and settlement of a prior action) and to recover, along with
~:.?5,000.00 punitive damages, the full amount demanded
in the prior action less $4,000.00 paid to settle it. The
complaint alleges that defendant's fraudulent representations had induced plaintiff to settle.
1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, and both parties moved for summary judgment.
The court granted plaintiff's motion, holding as a matter of law that plaintiff was entitled to have the prior
stipulation, judgment, and release set aside.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment andremand of the case with direction to dismiss the action with
prejudice; or, if this is denied, remand of the case to
the district court for trial of issues relating to the claimed
fraud, and to reliance, estoppel, clean hands, and plaintiff's timeliness.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Vera T. Callister (herein called "Vera")
was once married to Dr. Alfred Cyril Callister (herein
called "Dr. Callister"), now deceased. On July 30, 1945,
they were divorced (R. I) , and Dr. Callister was ordered
to pay monthly alimony. As of early 1955, Dr. Callister's
alimony payments were current, but in that year some
payments were missed and at Dr. Callister's death on
February 9, 1961, there had accrued under the terms
of the decree a principal indebtedness of $11,150.00
(R. 40).
Subsequent to his divorce, Dr. Callister married
defendant, Lucy C. Callister (herein called "Lucy"),
2
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nnd their rnarriage continued until Dr. Callister died.
Lut•y was appointed executrix, letters testamentary
W<'rc issued, and she qualified on or about :\larch 2-J.,
19tl 1 (H. 78). She has acted as executrix ever since.

On about .August 7, 1961, Lucy as executrix delivered to the clerk of the court an "Inventory and
.\ ppraismenf' of the probate estate, along with an "Inheritallcc Tax Report and r\ppraisment," completed
except for Yaluations by appraisers (R. 85, 100). The
probate in Yen tory showed an estate of only $809.12, but
the companion inheritance tax report showed that less
than three years before his death Dr. Callister had transferred a large nun1ber of shares of stock, and that when
he died Dr. Callister and Lucy held a joint tenancy in
two Yaluable parcels of local real property. The probate
appraisal was filed officially on August 24, 1961 (R.
s.;). and the inheritance tax appraisal was filed officially
on February 9, 1962 (R. 100-103).
~Ieanwhile,

in June, 1961, Yera's counsel had filed
a clain1 against the estate for $11,400.00 alimony, and
~:?.046.:28 interest, and on ~ ovember 1, 1961, the claim
was rejected (R. 87-89). On November 8, 1961, James
'""· Beless, Jr., then , . . era's only attorney of record,
filed suit against Lucy to establish Y' era's claim against
the estate and, in effect, to set aside the transfers to
Lucy by Dr. Callister (R. 21-26), the complaint alleging that the transfers were made "without consideration
and with intent to hinder, delay and defraud plaintiff as
a creditor," and that Lucy aided and abetted Dr. Callister in his fraudulent scheme. Lucy's answer admitted

3
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the transfers, denied they were fraudulent within the
meaning of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act (Title 25,
Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953), and raised
defenses of laches and estoppel, on the ground that Vera
had led Dr. Callister to believe she would not collect the
alimony, and that as a result Dr. Callister, who then
had grounds for reduction of alimony, failed to obtain
modification of the decree.
When the first action was brought, Vera's attorney
knew there was a conflict of interest between Lucy and
Vera, and that Lucy claimed the right to keep the property transferred to her by Dr. Callister (R. 21-23,
52 :4-5) .1 He also knew there was no actual confidential
relationship between the two women and that there had
been ill feeling between them for many years (R. 52:
28-29). He was experienced in probate _matters and
knew that Lucy, at the same time she was defending
a fraudulent conveyance action, would have to anticipate
that the tax collectors would claim that Dr. Callister
made the transfers "in contemplation of death" (R. 52:
10-11) .2

The fact of the transfers was never kept from Vera;
information about them was contained in the inheritance
1 As the record has been put together, each deposition is given
a separate page number. For convenience, depositions will be
referred to by the record page number followed by the page
number in the deposition, e.g., R. 52: 4-5 refers to pages 4 and
5 of the deposition of James W. Beless, Jr., and Vera T. Callister,
found at page 52 of the record.
2 Although Vera's counsel doesn't say so directly, his testimony
has to mean that he believed the existence of the tax problem
would help him force a settlement of the fraudulent conveyances
action (R. 52: 11, 57a).

4
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tux report and probate inventory which had been
cxnmincd by .Jlr. lleless prior to bringing the action
\H. :;:! :~l-10). .. \ llegations about the transfers of the
property and the fraudulent intentions of Dr. Callister
and Luey in Inaking the1n, in fact, comprised the bulk
of the cmnplaint in the first fraud action.
In preparing for trial of the first action Yera's
l'otmsel took Lucy's deposition and served interrogatories upon her. During the deposition Vera's counsel
began to inquire about the stock transfers and the
reasons for them:
"(~. (By ~Ir. Beless) Why were the transfers
of the stock made in 1959 from your husband
to you?
.A.. I didn't know they were made until after
they had been made and 111y husband told me he
thought it was best to put them in my name.

Q. '\Then did you find out they had been made?

. . \. I don't think it was until in 1960 sometime.
Q. Did the dividends come in your name?
~\.. l~ es

they did" (R. 59 :15).

But he abandoned the inquiry for no apparent
reason and asked no more questions in the deposition
or subsequent interrogatories (R. 31) about where or
when conversations occurred; how Lucy learned of the
transfers: or Dr. Callister's reasons for thinking "it was
best" to put then1 in Lucy's name. He made no effort
to interview other persons who might have knowledge
of Dr. Callister's affairs because "they were all hostile"

5
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(R. 52:18). But, notwithstanding the "representations"
in Lucy's inventories, answer to the complaint, deposition and answers to interrogatories, Vera moved forward with the action. On April 23, 1962, her counsel
served and filed a "Notice of Readiness for Trial" (R.
39) in which he certified that he had interviewed all
known witnesses he might call, used such discovery as
he felt necessary, and concluded all necessary examinations and depositions. On September 26, 1962, a pre-trial
conference was held by the court.

The Pre-Trial Order (R. 40-42) framed the following issues: whether in making the transfers Dr. Callister had an intent "presumed in law" to defraud his
creditors; whether he was rendered insolvent; and
whether Vera was estopped from asserting her claim
against the estate. All pleadings were merged in the
order, the effect of which was to eliminate from the case
any issue as to whether Dr. Callister had the "actual
intent" to defraud creditors (R. 40-42).
The order impressed Vera's counsel with the "difficulties" in his case (R. 52:26), and regenerated
thoughts of settlement. He returned to his office to write
a long, analytic letter to Lucy's counsel, suggesting that
Lucy, by paying Vera's claim, could save the difference
between the amount of that claim and death taxes which
might be imposed. (The letter is found at R. 52:57a,
and is reprinted as Appendix "A" to this brief.)
Although counsel's calculations were erroneous--overstating the tax-the implications were clear. He rec-

6
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ognized that \'era's claim of "fraudulent conveyance"
was inconsistent with the anticipated Tax Commission
cluim that the transfers were includable for estate tax
purposes because made "in contemplation of death."
Payment to Yera would help convince the tax authorities
thut Dr. Callister's intent was to place the property
beyond access of his former wife. 3
l t had been pointed out by Lucy's counsel that the
court could find the transfers were made to defraud
\'era as a creditor, while the taxing authorities could
find that the transfers were "in contemplation of death";
ulso, that Lucy possibly could prevail in both cases (R.
52:20).

X egotiations opened by the Beless letter of September 26, culminated in compromise: Lucy was to
pay $4,000.00 to \'"era in complete settlement of all her
clain1s against Lucy, individually and as executrix.
The money was paid and a release executed and
delivered by y· era. On October 10, 1962 (the date set
for trial), the parties entered into a stipulation that the
action be "distnissed with prejudice and on the merits,"
and on October 11 the following judgment was entered:

"l. . pon stipulation of the parties, and it appearing that the above entitled action has been fully
compromised and settled, it is ORDERED,
3 H. as counsel contends (R. 52: 16) ), he then believed Lucy's
denial of actual fraudulent intent, the letter was in effect asking
her to commit a fraud on the tax authorities by leading them to
believe that the transfers were made with intent to defraud
Vera. and not in contemplation of death. If he didn't believe it
there was no reliance at the time of settlement.
'

7
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ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the
above entiled action be, and it hereby is, dismissed
with prejudice and on the merits, each party to
bear her own costs."
As anticipated by all, the taxability of the transfers
became an issue, and in December Lucy presented to
the State Tax Commission three affidavits relating to
Dr. Callister's state of mind. Two affidavits from attorneys tended to show that Dr. Callister was concerned
about his former wife's claim for alimony; the third,
Lucy's own, contained a statement that Dr. Callister
had once said (the date not being indica ted) that he had
made the transfers fqr the purpose of putting the property "beyond access of his former wife." A copy of
Lucy's affidavit is found at R. 51 and in this brief as
Appendix "B."
The Tax Commission did not accept the affidavits
as conclusive as to intent and continued to claim the
right to death taxes on the transfers. A compromise
and settlement was stipulated between Lucy and the
Tax Commission on July 12, 1963, under which Lucy
paid the Tax Commission $4,286.61 in estate taxes (R.
129), representing one-half of the amount that would
have been payable if all of the transfers had been included in the gross estate. Thus Lucy had compromised
two claims against her, both of which were based in large
part, if not entirely, upon different, inconsistent states
of mind on the part of Dr. Callister-who was no longer
available to testify.
In March or April, 1963, Vera's lawyer learned of

8
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Luey's atl'id:n·it (R. 5~::!1, i8), but did nothing about
it "hceause frankly I wanted to see what the Tax Com-

mission did on this conflicting evidence," even though
he knew I .uey was then attempting to resolve the tax
dispute (H. ;)i:i7). At that 1noment Yera's counsel had
all the inforn1ation he later felt to be necessary to support rT:-.l·ission of the settlement, but took no action with
respect to rescission until August 27, when the present
complaint was filed (R. 1-6). It was Vera's lawyer who
told Y era of the affidaYit and advocated the bringing
of a second action (R. 52:28, 50).
For the purpose of this proceeding, the averments
of' the emu plaint are of little help; but the depositions
of .Jan1es \\r. Beless, Jr., and 'rera, and 'rera's affidavit,
spell out what conduct Y era claims to have been fraudulent. Compare the following excerpts:
(1) From 'rera's affidavit (R. 49-50):

"*** The above quoted facts (from Lucy's
affidaYit) were the Yery facts alleged by me to
be true in the assertion of a claim in the estate of
Dr. A. Cyril Callister, deceased, in the probate
of which defendant was executrix and also in an
action against defendant when said claim was
denied. Defendant denied the truth of my allegations in the probate and in the action, but after
I reduced 1ny claim and compromised it and gave
defendant a release based upon this denial, defendant filed the attached affidaYit with the Tax
Conrn1ission asserting the very things I had preYiously alleged and she had denied.
'·In settling the action brought by me to establish my claim I relied on the denial by defendant

9
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of Dr. Callister's intent to place them beyond
my access, which denials were contained in her
pleadings, deposition, and also in documents
on file in the probate of Dr. Callister's estate.
"Had the defendant disclosed to me the above
quoted facts which were known to her and which
she, as executrix, had the duty to do, I would
not have settled my claim for anything less than
the full amount due plus interest."
(2) Vera's deposition (R. 52):

"We settled for that $4,000.00 because I
thought there was no other chance of getting it,
to be exact, no other opportunity to get it"
(R. 52 :42).

*

*

*

A. I think I relied on my lawyer. If he had
suggested that there was no chance of getting
anything out of that debt that he owed me, I
would have dropped it, yes.
Q. But your decision
upon his judgment as to
the suit?
A. Well you usually
lawyer thinks best" (R.

*

would have been based
the probable outcome of
do the thing that your
52:42).

*

*

"Q. Is it fair to assume then that the reason
you settled the prior action was that your lawyer
advised you that it was probably best to settle it?

A. Well he made me see that it was best" (R.
52:43).

*

*

*

"A. Yes, she was disputing it and I figured if
$4,000 was all I could get from what was owed

10
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me. it was better to take that than to be pigheaded

und not take anything.
Q. This was by way of a settlement of that
suit?

.A. Yes.
Q. You knew that she was paying you some
tnoney that she didn't concede was due to you
either 1
~ \.

'\rhy wouldn't she think it was due to me?

Q. She had been saying this all through the
lawsuit, hadn't she?

.A. Yes, I guess she had-that she paid me, that
it came from her and not from the estate, the
$4,000?
Q. That is correct. You knew that it came from
her, didn't you?
A. Yes, if she put it that way" (R. 52:44).

*

*

*

"A. *** I settled it for that $4,000 strictly
on the advice of my lawyer, that it was the best
thing to do. *** Yes. We might have had nothing
at all if we would have gone to court about it
as far as I know" (R. 52:51).

* * *
"Q. Notwithstanding this affidavit, Mrs. Callister. you would probably have settled for $4,000
even then if you had been advised by counsel that
you should do so?

...-\.. 'Yell I think it's wise to take the opinion of
counsel ( R. 52 :54) .

11
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From the foregoing excerpts it is clear that Vera
settled the case on the advice of counsel. The following
quotations from the deposition of J. W. Beless, Jr.,
make it equally clear that his advice was given not
because of any belief in anything Lucy had told
him or concealed from him, but upon his professional
judgment that it would be difficult to prove a fraudulent
conveyance by Dr. Callister:
Q. So that (prior to bringing the first action)
you would be able to tell from examining those
two documents that although the probate inventory listed assets of approximately $800.00, the
inventory for tax purposes listed assets in excess
of One Hundred Thousand Dollars?

A. That is correct, and I had checked the record
as to the real property owned by Dr. Callister
and I had determined that there were two parcels
owned by him and Lucy Callister as joint
tenants" (R. 52:10).

*

*

*

"Q. When you say you felt you had a good
lawsuit, you are speaking as of September 26,
1962?

A. That is correct.
Q. When did you change your mind about
that?

A. I believe that I would say this: Shortly
after the pre-trial conference before Judge
Ellett. You possibly have the date of that there
in your file.
Q. Yes, the pre-trial conference is dated September 26, 1962.

12
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..:\ ..At that tin1e I was faced with proving one
of two things: One, that Dr. Callister was made
insolvent by these transfers; two, that Dr. Callister intentionally made these transfers to aYoid
this creditor.
1\t that time I had taken the deposition of
Lucy Callister and I knew that I was faced with
little proof as to his actual intent. ***

Q. So that you were faced with the problem
of proof on the achJ_al intent?

A. I was, and at that time I did considerable
research and my finding was that there was some
lTtah law in my favor but there was considerable
law on the matter of insolvency which was definitely against me. And at that time, immediately
after this letter, I conferred with you regarding
the possibility of a settlement.

Q. That is right, you brought it up, didn't you?
A. I think this letter probably was the initiation
of that settlement. There had been offers before
that time. You had offered back in August of
1961 to settle it" (R. 52:12-13).

* * *
"Q. Forming your professional judgment as
to the difficulties of proof of Dr. Callister's
actual intent, I suppose you were aware of and
somewhat concerned with the fact that communications from Dr. Callister to his then wife would
be privileged?

A. Yes, I was very much concerned with that.
In fact this 'll'as why I felt that my only possibility
tL·as in either a presumption in law of intent~ or
in a possibility of the law being construed as to

13
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this matter of insolvency~~ (R. 52:14). (Emphasis
added.)

*

*

*

"Q. Going back to the period starting with the
initiation of the first action inN ovember of 1961
and its settlement in 1962, I believe it was
October, had Lucy Callister made any representations to you that changed your mind about the
allegations as to the attempt to defraud that you
had made in the complaint?

A. I think she had in this respect: Certainly
her pleadings had specifically denied the intent
of Dr. Callister and had denied her knowledge in
the part where I allege she aided and abetted him
in these transfers. And also when I took her deposition she stated specifically, in answer to my
question as to whether she was familiar with her
answer to my complaint, that she was. She also
was acting as executrix here and I think that by
the nature of her two inventories she made a representation here upon which we definitely relied.

***
I think that the representations that were made
to me by Lucy Callister were her pleadings, the
probate and inheritance tax inventories, and her
reaffirmation of the effect of those in her deposition.
Q. Did you believe her when she said that these
transfers weren't made for the intent of defrauding Vera?
A. I think after she made her reaffirmation in
her deposition I did" (R. 52:15-17).

*

*

*
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Q. So you don't know specifically of any cmnmunications that would have been made to
( Lu('y) strictly in her capacity as executrix that
she hasn't disclosed 1 ***
.A. I ha,·e no other information respecting his
atl'airs. I can only rely on what was filed.
(~. 'Vhat this reliance of yours boils down to
is that if ~Irs. Callister had told you of communications from her husband which would have been
usable against her and which you had concluded
would be sufficient to win the case for you, you
wouldn't have settled it?
A. I certainly would not have.
Q. But other than the things she told you about
the case in answer to questions in depositions
and interrogatories, she never made any communications to you or directed any to you that
kept you from going about your work to find out
what the case was all about, did she?
A. No, I had no communication with her.
Q. That is right, so that you were free to go
ahead and have your day in court?
A. That is correct. ***
Q. One thing I haven't got clear, you may have
answered it, but I beheve you said up until Septenlber 26 when you wrote the letter to me you
believed you had a good lawsuit?*** Now what
happened on that day which altered your judgment about the worth of the lawsuit?
A. I think Judge Ellett spelled out very clearly
my difficulties in his pre-trial order" (R. 52:2526}.
Yera kept the $4,000.00 (R. 52 :-:t4). Letting Vera
ha,-e her cake and eat it must have concerned the trial

15
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judge, for in setting aside the judgment and release he
directed era to pay $4,000.00 plus interest into the
court, its disposition to await further order (R. 62).

'T

On the basis of the depositions, Vera's affidavit,
and the file in the previous case, the court ruled that
the judgment should be set aside, for the following
reasons:

"*** Lucy Callister as administratrix of the
estate of Cyril Callister had a duty to marshal
the assets and to recover all property transferred
in fraud of creditors; that this duty as a court
officer came ahead of any right that she might
have had as an heir or as a transferee; that it
appears she had a conflict of interest at the time;
that since she was in possession of information
that would have tended to have brought assets
in the estate and by failing to resign, she has
placed creditors in a position that they would not
have been in if she had been attempting to marshal all the assets that could come into the estate;
and that it appears to the court that this plaintiff
in making the settlement did so without full
knowledge of all of the information possessed
by the administratrix at the time of the settlement" ( R. 53-54) .
ARGUMENT
I

THE RECORD IS DEVOID OF ANY
EVIDENCE OF FRAUD ON THE PART
OF DEFENDANT.
16
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The l Tnifurn1 Fraudulent Conveyances Act,
udopted in Utah as Title ~5, Chapter 1, Utah Code
•\nnotated 1953, pern1its creditors to set aside certain
l'Oil\·eyances by their debtors. In 25-1-4 U.C.A. 1953
there is a provision that transfers which render a person
insolvent, or which are made when he is insolvent, are
fmudulent as to his creditors; and under 25-1-7 conveyances made and obligations incurred "with actual intent,
as distinguished from intent presumed in law," to hinder,
delay or defraud present or future creditors are fraudulent as to them.
\r era's complaint in the original action alleged both

of the statutory grounds for setting aside conveyances
made by Dr. Callister, but Vera's counsel conceived
some difficulty in establishing "constructive" fraud because Dr. Callister retained a joint tenancy interest in
real property which greatly exceeded his indebtedness.
Aetual fraudulent intent was pleaded, even though
Y era's counsel had no information supporting such an
allegation (R. 52:8) .4
Apart frmn the question of constructive fraud arising fron1 insolvency, the complaint and answer put in
issue the purpose-the state of mind-of Dr. Callister,
since deceased, at the time he transferred some stocks
in 1959.
It is con1mon knowledge that when an owner of
property transfers it he may be motivated by a number
of factors, no one of which represents the reason for the
4

Does this violation of Rule 11 constitute "fraud"?
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transfer. To reconstruct the specific intent of a deceased
person it is usually necessary to rely upon circumstantial evidence, since the transactions are not often accompanied by declarations of intent and, when they are,
the declarations may not be true. The greater worth of
circumstantial evidence has been recognized in the cases.
See 37 C.J.S., Fraudulent Conveyances~ §422, p. 1267
et seq:
"*** Fraudulent intent may be established by
proof of facts and circumstances from which suc.h
an inference may reasonably be drawn, such as
the deed, the acts of the parties, and the surrounding circumstances, and it need not necessarily be
proved as an independent fact; but all of the
circumstances proved must be considered together.***
'"'"Weight of direct testim,ony. Fraudulent intent may be inferred from the acts done and the
surrounding circumstances, which must be taken
into consideration, notwithstanding the party
making the transfer denies fraudulent intent.
While it has been held that the fact of the testimony of one of the defendants who was a party
to the conveyance which tends to show that it was
without fraudulent intent, is not believable is not
a circumstance from which such intent can be
found, it has also been held that fraud may be
established from the intrinsic improbability of,
or contradictions in, the testimony denying fraud;
and, where the testimony relied on show good
faith in the making of a transfer is given by interested relatives only, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their evidence has considerable
weight."
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It is clear that in the first action Y' era had access
tu eit'l'ttmstantial proof and was not dependent upon
obtaining f'rmn Lucy a report of communications between Dr. Callister and Lucy before he died; and if she
hnd learned of con1munications between husband and
wit'~. there is serious doubt whether the information
could have helped her in the trial of her case. The statenwnt referred to in Lucy's affidavit to the Tax COinmission was probably privileged under the provisions of
iH-~4-8 U.C ..A.. 1953, since the privilege continues to
exist though the 1narriage has ended by divorce or death .
. \nd if. for smne reason, it were held that the privilege
did not apply, still it is doubtful that a statement made
hy Dr. Callister subsequent to the transfers (R. 54-55)
would be admissible in evidence against Lucy. See two
annotations relating to admissibility of statements of a
transferror in an action against a transferee in 64
A.L.R. 797 and 83 A.L.R. 1446.
The affirmative representations upon which Vera
clai1ns to haYe relied are described by her counsel as "her
pleadings, the probate and inheritance tax inventories,
and her reaffirmation of the effect of those in her deposition" (R. 52 :17).
The pleadings aren"'t fraudulent. Lucy presently
contends and has contended all along that the transfers
weren't made with intent to defraud Vera. The evidence
was such that a trier-of-fact could find that the transfers
were n1ade "in contemplation of death," or for the purpose of' seeing that the parties' young son was cared for,
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or out of gratitude. Denial of averments of fraudulent
intent was based upon more substantial evidence than
the averments themselves. There was good ground to
support the answer and it was properly entered under
Rule 11, notwithstanding there might have been some
evidence supporting the complaint. 5 Under Vera's theory
every litigant who lost a fact issue would be fraudulent
ab initio.

The inventories aren~t fraudulent. They show on
their face that the transfers were made and that Lucy
doesn't consider the property to be part of the estate.
There is no contention that the property wasn~t transferred. Fraudulent conveyances are voidable, not void.
Moreover, these ''representations'' were made before the
first case was filed, so there couldn't have been any
reliance upon them.
The deposition isn~t fraudulent. We have searched
in vain for Lucy's "reaffirmation of the effect of those"
(R. 52 :17). Vera's counsel had the opportunity to crossexamine Lucy at length about the transfers but didn't
do it. Her deposition contains no statements inconsistent
with her later statements or her later conduct. Perforce,
Vera's counsel "had to rely on the general tone of her
deposition" (R. 52:18).
Inasmuch as there were no actionable misrepresentations, the only thing left is a failure to disclose. The
5 Judge Ellett's order reinstated the fraudulent conveyance issue
as one to be tried. Does Lucy now have a duty to amend her
answer and admit the conveyances were made with intent to
defraud Vera, i.e., confess judgment? Is her failure to do so
fraudulent?
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trinl court took the view that Lucy had a duty to tell
r era about a post-transfer, out-of-court declaration
made by Dr. Callister. This is not the law with respect
to litigants generally.
There aren't very many cases in which it has been
argued that one litigant has a duty voluntarily6 to disl'lost' to his adversary the existence or source of evidence
helpful to the adversary's case. Whe!l the argument has
been made, it has generally been rejected. The question
was considered by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in
two early cases, Mills" Heirs v. Lee_, 22 Ky. 91, 17
Am. Dec. 118, and Taylor v. Bradshaw_, 22 Ky. 146,
Ii Am. Dec. 132. The Mills" Heirs case arose out of
an action between claimants to real property, which
action had been compromised by Mills with Lee and
Graham. After 1\tlills's death, his heirs sought to set
aside the compromise on the ground that at the time
of the settletnent Lee and Graham had known of an
entry in the land records that tended to prove their
clain1s invalid. The court held that failure to disclose the
entry was not fraudulent concealment, saying:
"The compromise of a doubtful claim cannot
be set aside, but for fraudulent misrepresentation
of facts, or fraudulent concealment of facts, or
such imposition otherwise as amounts to unconscientious and unfair dealing.
In discussing the duty to disclose evidence, we have inserted
the word "voluntarily" although it it is not generally used by the
cc;)Urts. We have done so in. recog~ition of the. right to compel
disclosures by means of various discovery devices provided for
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

6

21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"'Ve say fraudulent concealment of facts, because a concealment of that which a party was not
bound to disclose, would not be ground for avoiding a compromise. Suppose Lee and Graham had
known that these warrants had been assigned
away after the survey of 1784 had been executed,
and that other lands had been surveyed in 1785,
and believed, as they state, that those .assignments
had been illegally and surreptitiously made, were
they bound as suitors in court, upon a treaty of
compromise, to have disclosed the facts to their
adversary, to strengthen his defense in case no
compromise was effected. To say that they were,
would be to lay down a rule too refined for the
common sense and understanding of upright
men. It would, in effect, prescribe to those in a
treaty for a compromise of doubtful conflicting
claims, the duty to disclose the weaknesses, doubts
and difficulties of their respective claims and discourage all compromises.

"***In the present case the end and aim of the
parties in contracting and compromising an existing suit was to avoid the hazard and expense of
litigation. No reasonable man ought to expect in
such communication that the one party or the
other is bound to mutual disclosure of the means
of attack and defense in case the compromise does
not succeed. Such a rule would forbid all attempts
at compromise."

Taylor v. Bradshaw involved an occupier's claim
for improvements in an ejectment action. Commissioners
fixed the amount to be allowed but thereafter an equitable action was brought for relief from the judgment
on the ground that the occupier ha~ fraudulently concealed facts showing that he had no color of title and was
22
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not an ··mTu pying clai1nant." In denying relief the court
said:

"*** It would be going further than we have
any recollection of any court having gone, and
further than any court ought to go to fix upon
Bradshaw the commission of fraud, merely because he did not disclose to his adversary all the
circun1stances within his knowledge that might
tend to weaken his claim or defeat his recovery .

•••

''Frmn those who have reason to expect information fron1 us the truth should not be withheld,
but such as look not to us for information and
expect no disclosure from us, have no cause to
cmnplain of our silence, and to reproach us for
not speaking with having suppressed the truth.
"By the act of Bradshaw's asserting claims for
improvements the appellants were admonished
not to expect from him a disclosure of any which
would prove he was not entitled to the benefits
of the occupying claimant's law, and it would be
preposterous to suppose that they were deluded
and deceived by any failure of his, in not disclosing to them evidence which might defeat his
claim."
\Yhen Lucy claimed the right to property transferred by Dr. Callister and denied era's claim against
the estate, Y era was admonished not to expect from
Lucy a disclosure of anything which would tend to
proye that the conveyances were fraudulent, and it would
be preposterous to suppose that she was deluded and
deceiYed by any failure to disclose to Vera evidence
which n1ight help establish her claim. The aim of the

'r
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negotiations was to compromise and settle a disputed
claim, and it would have been unreasonable for Vera or
her counsel to expect that Lucy would make known to
them evidence which might be used by them to her detriment if a compromise were not agreed upon.
Indeed, the depositions of Vera and her lawyer
clearly show that there was no "reliance" on any fact
as "true," but only a professional judgment by Vera's
lawyer that a pigeon in the hand was better than a golden
eagle in the bush. Since Vera relied on this judgment,
she cannot now claim she relied on Lucy's honorable
intentions toward her. See Colton v. Stanford, 82 Cal.
351, 23 Pac. 16, 16 Am.St.Rep. 137, in which the Supreme Court of California said:
"Whatever may have been said as to the presumptions arising out of proof of a fiduciary
relation, the fundamental principle upon which
rescission is granted is always, and under all circumstances, the claim and consideration that
confidence has been reposed, and that confidence
has been abused. No such claim can in reason be
made where the party seeking rescission-being
of competent age and understanding, and acting
only in his own interest-has undertaken to investigate for himself, called in experts, been given
free and fair means of ascertaining the truth,
acted upon his own judgment and the advice of
friends, and repudiated any confidence in or
reliance upon the parties within whom he was
dealing. It matters not what the relations of the
parties have been prior to, or are at the time of,
the negotiations for a settlement and compromise
of their disputes, the principle is one of universal
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application, and it is a principle of common sense
and of good policy.***
"*** If, at the time of the purchase or compromise, the trustee has shaken off his fiduciary
character, and the confidence which is presumed
to result therefrom, it matters not what has occurred immediately preceding or long prior to
the final transaction. In other words, if the transaction is one in which the trustee may lawfully
deal with the cestui que trust by first dissolving
the trust relation, it is not too late for him to do
so at any time before the cestui que trust is prevented from making a full and fair investigation
in consideration of the business in hand, and before he executes the contract.***
"Under such circumstances, is plaintiff entitled
to a rescission of the contract thus deliberately
entered into 1 We think she is not. Her counsel
claims there was actual and constructive fraud.
*** They say that defendants furnished a list
of the assets of the Western Development Com.:
pany; that this was equivalent to a positive assertion that the list contained all of the assets-an
assertion not true, not warranted by the information of the parties making it, and therefore
fraudulent, although they believed it to be true;
*** but the rule as stated is not, upon authority
or principle, applicable where such party, discarding the representation as unworthy of belief,
proceeds to inquire for himself, is given full and
fair facilities of informing himself, takes independent counsel, and :finally acts upon his own judgment and that of his advisors. Misrepresentations
cannot be predicated upon such a state of facts."
As pointed out hereinafter, there is respectable
authority that Lucy never occupied a fiduciary position
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with respect to Vera; but if she ever did, the relationship
was terminated when Vera renounced it, made a claim
against the estate, retained counsel, and brought suit
against Lucy, as executrix and individually, claiming
that Lucy and her late husband had conspired to defraud
Vera as a creditor, and that Lucy's individual property
was subject to her claim.
"The essence of the test is whether or not under all
of the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks
of an arm's length bargain." Pepper v. Litton.. 308 U.S.
295, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281. The transaction between Lucy and Vera was at arm's length, through
counsel, and Lucy had no duty to disclose facts that
might weaken her case. Thompson v. J(ansas City C.C.
and St. J. Ry. Co ... 224 Mo. App. 415, 27 S.W.2d 58;
and Western Grain Company Cases .. 264 Ala. 145, 85
So.2d 395, containing a lengthy analysis of various fiduciary relationships and the duties of disclosure arising
out of them.
In the first action-as in this one-Vera and Lucy
were antagonistic adversaries/ Vera didn't rely on Lucy
to pay her claim, or to do anything for her, but employed
counsel and set about to establish a claim to reach Lucy's
property. Actionable fraud requires a misrepresentation
or fraudulent concealment of a material fact and among other things-reliance by the party claiming
fraud. Oberg v. Sanders .. Ill Utah 407, 184 P.2d 229;
Pace v. Parrish et al., 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273.
ftiiW_

7

If the partiesA wished to compromise and settle, could Lucy

do so with any assurance ~finality? She is still executrix.
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l" ruler all the fads and circtunstances, not only was
the t·ourt not justified in finding fraud, it was required
to tind that there wasn't any fraud.

II
TilE FlL\CD RELIED
UPON BY
PL.\IXTIFF, IF THERE 'VAS ANY, IS
lXSUFFICIENT IN LA'V TO JUSTIFY
THE TRI~\L COURT IN SETTING ASIDE
. . \ .JC"D(~~IENT, .AND THE DEFENDANT
IS EXTITLED TO .A DISMISSAL AS A
~lATTER OF LAW.
The fraud clain1ed by '-r era as the basis for setting
nside the prior judgment relates directly to a factual
issue in the prior action, viz., the actual intent of Dr.
Callister when he transferred property to Lucy; and
this court has recently ruled upon the type of fraud
which n1ust be present to justify setting aside a judgment. In Haner 1'. Haner, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P.2d
.>77, a motion had been made to have a judgment set
aside, one of the grounds being that the defendant had
made false representations in procuring the judgment.
Denial of the motion was affirmed, the court saying:
"***Inasmuch as the plaintiff here seems to
be relying on the ground of fraud, there is a distinction which it is necessary to point out. In
order to justify granting relief, the alleged wrong
would have to be of the type characterized as
extrinsic fraud: That is, fraud based on conduct
or activities outside the court proceedings them-
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selves; and which is designed and has the effect
of depriving the other party of the opportunity
to present his claim or defense. This type of
fraud, which is regarded as a fraud not only upon
the opponent, but upon the court itself, can be
accomplished in a number of ways, such as making
false statements or representations to the other
party or to witnesses to prevent them from contesting the issues ; or by that means or otherwise
preventing the attendance of the parties or witnesses ; or by destroying or secreting evidence;
so that a fair trial of the issues is effectively prevented.
"It is obvious that quite a different situation
exists where there is no prevention of the parties
contesting the issues in a trial, and where the complaint is si1nply that one party presented perjured testimony or false evidence. This charge is
simply a continuation of the same dispute which
the trial was supposed to resolve. It is the purpose of the law to afford the parties full opportunity to have themselves and their witnesses
present; and to present their evidence and their
contentions to the court. When this has been done
and the court has made its determination, that
should end the matter, except for the right of
appeal. It is so patent as to hardly justify comment that a judgment should not be set side
merely to grant the losing party another chance
to accomplish the task at which he just failed;
to prove that he was right and the opponent was
wrong. To re-open a case just because a party
persists in asserting and attempting to prove that
his version of a dispute was the truth and that
of the opponent was false would open the door to
a repetition of ,~he procedure, whoever won the
next time; and thus to keeping the dispute going
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ad infinitum with no way of determining when
the merry-go-round of the lawsuit would end."
See also Wright v. W. E. Callahan Construction
('o. ff al, 108 Utah 28, 156 P.2d 710, to like effect.
In the above cases, the "fraud" relied upon was
perjured testimony, or something similar. In the present
case, no perjured testimony is involved, the claimed
fraud being the failure of Lucy to disclose evidence
which might tend to weaken her case. This is not extrinsic
fraud.

Burch v. The 1-Iibernia Bank et al., 146 Cal. App.
~d 422, 304 P.2d 212, was an action for fraud and
restoration of a leasehold, the plaintiff's rights having
been adjudicated in a prior action brought by defendant
bank. Plaintiff claimed the bank had misrepresented
to plaintiff and the court the nature of its rights in the
property, the existence of a U.S. District Court injunction affecting the bank's right to foreclose. The trial
court ruled against plaintiff as a matter of law and the
District Court of Appeals affirmed, saying:
"The concealment of a party of evidence which,
if disclosed, would tend to overthrow his case is
not extrinsic fraud. Hogan v. Hogan, 131 Cal.
App.2d 281, p. 284, 280 P .2d 64, at page 66, says:
'It is settled in this State that a judgment will
not be set aside because it is based upon perjured
testimony or because material evidence is concealed or suppressed, that such fraud both as to
the court and the party against whom judgment
is rendered is not fraud extrinsic to the record
for which relief may be had.'
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"***The allegations as to what (The Hibernia Bank) did and did not do in that suit are in
effect that the judgment was obtained by perjury,
false evidence, and concealment of other evidence.
The alleged concealment went to the merits of
the cause submitted for judgment. If there was
fraud it was intrinsic, not extrinsic (citing cases).
The rule is the same whether the judgment sought
to be set aside is a default judgment or rendered
after answer and contested trial (citing cases).***
"The representations alleged to have been
made to plaintiff by Hibernia prior to the quiet
title suit as to its legal position, identical with its
claim in the suit, do not constitute extrinsic fraud
(citation) . Such alleged representations were
merely that Hibernia had a superior title. They
were exactly the same representations made to
the court in the suit to quiet title. To be extrinsic
the fraud must be collateral to the matter which
was tried and determined by the court (citations) .***"
A like holding is found in Pietro v. Pietro~ 147 Cal.
App.2d 788, 305 P.2d 916, an action to set aside a
divorce decree on the ground that it was obtained by
fraud. One of the grounds relied upon was that the
wife's attorney in the divorce case had retained two
written agreements which prevented the plaintiff from
proving ownership of property in dispute. The court
held the complaint insufficient:
"Plaintiff's first charge is that Madeline's attorney retained two written agreements which
prevented him from proving his ownership of the
property. Plaintiff could have forced the production of these documents by subpoena duces tecum
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directed to her counsel, or by an appropriate
denmwl in open court. Conceahnent by a party oi:'
e,·idence which, if disclosed, would tend to overthrow this case, is not extrinsic fraud and therefore is not grounds for a suit to set aside a judgment.''
Dr. Callister's state of mind at the time he transferred property was an issue directly involved in the
previous case. Therefore, any fraud with respect to that
state of Inind, either by perjury or concealment, would
be intrinsic and not a basis for setting aside the judgment unless the relationship between Vera and Lucy
was such that there was a special duty of disclosure.

III

THERE WAS NO FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENDANT WHICH PLACED UPON
THE DEFENDANT A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
TO THE PL.A.INTIFF EVIDENTIAL FACTS
AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF THE
PRIOR ACTION.
Yera takes the position that because she asserted
a claim against the estate (even though it was denied
and has not been established by judgment) there arose
a fiduciary relationship between her and Lucy which
required Lucy to disclose to her everything Lucy knew
that might aid her claim against Lucy as an individualregardless of how or in what capacity Lucy acquired
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the knowledge. Neither history nor common sense supports the proposition.
At common law a personal representative had no
standing to bring an action to recover assets conveyed
by a decedent in fraud of creditors. See 2 Bancroft's
Probate Practice (2nd Edition) §47 4, wherein it is
stated:
"There is a clear distinction between an action
attacking a conveyance or transfer on the ground
of fraud or undue influence of the grantee or
transferee, and an action to set asid~ a conveyance
by the decedent as in fraud of creditors. Since the
decedent could not himself take advantage of his
own fraud, he would have no right of action in
the latter instance were he alive. It is therefore
an anomaly in the law if a right of action exists
in the executor or administrator of the decedent
after his death, and it is evident that, in the absence of statutory power~ no right of action could
inure to the personal representative of the decedent as such to sue to set aside the latter~s conveyances in fraud of creditors~ although the creditors might maintain an action for their own benefit and in their own right. There is apparently
nothing, however, to inhibit the legislature from
making the executor or administrator the statutory agent for the creditors for the purpose of
bringing such action. As shown in the next section, in fact, statutes now exist in most of the
western states which expressly so empower and
require the representative to act." (Emphasis
added.)
Utah has a statute under which a personal representative must bring action in behalf of creditors if cer-
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tnin conditions are tnet. 75-11-1:J U.C.A. 1953. But the
duty is limited by 75-11-1-J. U.C ..A. 1953, which provides
that the personal representative need not bring suit
except upon application of the. creditors who will pay
the costs of the suit or put up such security as may be
ordered by the court.
\"era never did 1nake a demand upon the personal
representative that suit be brought; neither did she offer
to pay the expenses of such a suit; nor, as she might
have done under the authority of Farnsworth et al. v.
/latch, 41 Utah 0:.?, 151 Pac. 537, did she make an effort
to have the executrix removed because of an obvious
conflict of interest known to Vera and her counsel (R.
5:? :4. 39, 45). Yet they now contend that Lucy should
have acted in a manner that-as recognized in F arnstt•orth-interested parties cannot reasonably be expected
to act:
"In the nature of things, it is not J!Ossible for
any one to act with perfect impartiality and fairness in a matter which he claims valuable and
itnportant interests. The fact is universally recognized, and especially in our courts of justice,
and the only reason that it is not always strictly
applied is because it is impractical to do so."
This court has held that a creditor may not bring
an action in his own name to set aside a conveyance by
decedent without having made an unsuccessful demand
on the personal representative to bring the action. Fehringer r. Commercial ?\"'ational Bank of Ogden~ 23 Utah
393, 64 Pac. 1108. On the other hand, it has been held
that where the alleged fraudulent grantee is also the
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personal representative the action may be brought by
the creditors. 2 B ancroff s Probate Practice (2nd Ed.)
§477. That is what Vera did in this case; but recognition
of her right to sue is of necessity based upon a recognition that her interests are in conflict with Lucy's interests
as executrix, and that it would be unrealistic to expect
Lucy to protect Vera's claim. See Emmons v. Barton)
109 Cal. 662, 42 Pac. 303, in which a creditor was permitted to bring action against the grantee-executrix
without prior demand, and in which, incidentally, the
California Supreme Court held that statements of the
deceased husband, made after the conveyance about title
to the property, were erroneously admitted against the
executrix.
A case factually quite similar to the present one is
Borge v. Traaen~ 158 Ore. 454, 75 P.2d 939, 76 P.2d
1127, wherein a decedent, while indebted to the claimant,
had conveyed to his wife through a third person certain
North Dakota real property. The property was not
listed in the probate inventory. After the estate was
closed the claimant, holder of a note upon which approximately $3,000.00 was due, brought an action
against the widow and erstwhile executrix to impress a
trust upon proceeds obtained from sale of the North
Dakota property, on the theory that the creditors had
been defrauded by failure of the widow to disclose the
transaction by which the property was conveyed to her.
The court noted that the indebtedness had never
been reduced to judgment, and that no claim had been
presented to the administratrix. It held that an equitable
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lien is not a,·ailable to a creditor until he has disclosed
that the debtor is insolvent and, further, that "one of
the tirst requisites in maintaining a creditor's bill is that
the cre(litor has established his claim or debt by judgment at law." It was held that before the claimant could
maintnin such suit he had to reduce his claim to judgment.
I

Comtnenting on the relationship between the claimant and the personal representative, the Supreme Court
of Oregon said:
".:\ccording to the allegations of the complaint,
the farn1land inN orth Dakota was not owned by
Thomas Traaen at the time of his death. Neither
it nor the contract for its sale was property which
should have been listed or inventoried as a part of
his estate. X o fraud, therefore, was committed by
the adtninistratrix in omitting to list or inventory
that land or the value of the contract for its sale.
If Thomas Traaen was insolvent at the time he
conveyed the property, and if he so conveyed or
transferred it in order to hinder, delay, or defraud
his creditors, the plaintiff could have brought proceedings against him during his lifetime, to have
such conveyance declared void insofar as her claim
against hi~ was concerned. Even though she had
not brought such proceedings against him, she
still, upon the approval of her claim by the administratrix or by the court, could have caused proper
proceedings to be instituted by the administratrix
under sections 11-633 and 11-634, supra, and if
the administratrix had been a party to such conve:rance~ she could have been removed and another administrator appointed. Since the plaintiff
did not follow either procedure, she is not now,
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after her claim against the estate is barred by her
failure to file it, in a position to maintain this suit.
"The excuse given by the plaintiff ***for not
presenting her claim to the probate court was that
the inventory showed that the assets of the estate
were only $7 50.00, and the fraud complained of
is the failure of the administratrix to list among
the assets of the estate the property owned by her
which was fraudulently conveyed by Thomas
Traaen.
"Numerous authorities are cited by the appellant to the effect that an heir of the decedent may,
when the administrator or executor has fraudulently concealed property which rightfully belongs to the heir, bring a suit in equity against
such administrator or executor after the estate
of the decedent has been closed. To the same
effect, cases may be cited involving the failure
of a guardian to account for property belonging
to his ward. That such decisions are not here in
point is too obvious to require discussion."
The above case is important not because Lucy
objects to the procedure chosen by Vera, but because it
shows that technically Vera was not a creditor and, also
technically, there was no fiduciary relationship.
Assuming, for sake of argument, that there is a
fiduciary relationship (for some purposes) between
a claimant and an executrix, there is still the problem
(suggested by cases cited under Point I) of circumscribing the duties of the executrix and determining the areas
in which the "trust and confidence" may exist.
That a fiduciary relationship may create duties only
w:' h respect to particular property held by or particular
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kinds of transactions entered into by the fiduciary was
recognized by this court in In Re Blodgett's Estate, 93
Utah l, 70 P.2d 742. One of the beneficiaries, ~Irs.
Blodgett. eontended that a contract relating to distribution of the estate should be set aside because of the failure of l\lr. Crosby, co-heir and administrator, to make
full disclosure. Mrs. Blodgett contended that she and
Crosby occupied a fiduciary and confidential relationship
and that Crosby had the burden of proving at least
prima facie that he had not concealed information he was
duty bound to disclose, nor suppressed property belonging to the estate. Crosby contended that there was no
actual relation of confidence because Mrs. Blodgett was
distrustful of Crosby, had her own attorney and relied
on him rather than on Crosby. The court said:
"~Irs. Blodgett was a beneficiary or, perhaps
to put it in a form to better suit appellant's counsel, she had an interest in the estate. Likewise did
Crosby. Crosby was also the administrator or
manager of the estate in Utah. As administrator
he had the duty to make full disclosure of all
matters and information regarding the estate.
It is not unlike a partnership where one partner
manages the business. He must make full disclosure of his acts and the state of the business
and render a correct accounting. But being the
superior party in such case did not mean that he
is under obligation to advise his partner in matters affecting a conflict of interests between themselves. As to external affairs of the estate, yes,
but there is no obligation on the part of one heir
7.cho is an administrator to either give advice or
wisdom to a co-heir in matters where there is a
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conflict or a controversy as to the extent or nature
of their respective rights. His duty as administrator went to the obligation to take into possession
and disclose all estate property and all information to those interested in the estate as to estate
matters, thus putting them on the same plane
as he was as to such information regarding all the
assets and transactions, but, when that is done,
he has performed his duty to a party in regard
to whom he is in controversy as to their respective
interests. In that relationship, after they are on
an even plane as to all estate matters, she must
exercise the decisions as to whether she will stand
firm or recede in the controversy between them
as to differences of opinion regarding their
rights.***
''All we need to do is to determine if there were
reasonable grounds for controversy and, if so,
whether he furnished her full information as
executor from which she could decide in their
controversv as beneficiaries what she would or
would no do. When he did this and she was fully
informed and acted not on his advice, which he
was not required to give, but on her own judgment and on that of her attorney Styskal, he had
no responsibility for her decisions.***
"We have attempted to draw the line of his
duties. We do not need to indulge in phrases or
applications of doctrines. Nor do we need to cite
cases. The law is plain that he has his duty as
trustee to her and as such it must be fully performed. But, once performed, it does not extend
into a field ·where trusteeship stops and adverse
interest begins.,, (Emphasis added.)
The court went on to decide that there was no such
failure to disclose as would warrant invalidating the
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agret·ment between the manager of the property for
Utah and his co-heir, ~Irs. Blodgett.
Our own situation is somewhat analogous. Not only
was there no actual relationship of trust and confidence
betwetll Vera and Lucy, there had been "bad blood"
between the two women ever since Dr. Callister and
r era were divorced, and, as indicated by Vera's counsel,
one of the ideas behind settlement of the suit was "not
to have two mean-mad women in court together at the
same time at the same place" (R. 52:29).
A principal similar to that announced in Blodgett
was recognized by the Supreme Court of California in
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen_, 32 Cal.2d 13, 193 P.2d 728, involving a property settlement between a husband and
wife at the threshold of divorce. The wife, claiming that
her husband had fraudulently concealed information or
made misrepresentations as to the classification of property which was community property, sought to vacate
the settlement, relying upon a well-established California rule that one spouse has a fiduciary duty to disclose
community assets to the other.
In the fraud action the wife contended that certain
corporate shares had been community property when
the property settlement agreement was executed, but
through the husband's fraud the property settlement
agreement provided that the shares were his separate
property. She contended that the part of the decree
approving the agreement was induced by defendant's
false representations and that, because of the relation-
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ship, the fraud was extrinsic, entitling her to equitable
relief from the decree. The Supreme Court disagreed:
"As manager of the community property the
husband occupies a position of trust (Civil Code,
§§172-173, 158), which is not terminated as to
assets remaining in his hands when the spouses
separate. It is part of his fiduciary duties to account to the wife for the community property
when the spouses are negotiating a property
settlement agreement. The concealment of community property assets by the husband from the
wife in connection with such an agreement is
therefore breach of a fiduciary duty of the husband that deprives the wife of an opportunity
to protect her rights in the concealed assets and
thus warrants equitable relief from a judgment
approving such agreement. *** The issue in the
present case is whether under the facts stated in
her amended complaint the wife was deprived of
a fair opportunity to submit her case fully to the
court because of a breach of a fiduciary duty of
the husband. There is no allegation in the complaint that defendant concealed assets that were
part of the community property. The assets were
disclosed, and the complaint is based on the theory
that defendant fraudulently claimed certain community property as his separate estate. The classification of property as separate or community
is frequently difficult. A husband at the time of
divorce or separation is entitled to take a position
favorable to his own interest in claiming as his
separate property assets that a court might hold
to be com1nunity property. Confronted with the
assertion by the husband that certain a.Ysets are
his separate property the wife must take her own
position and if necessary investigate the facts.***
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If the ·wife and her attorney are satisfied with the
husband's classification of the property as separate or comrnunif.tJ, the wife cannot reasonabLy
contend that fraud was committed or that there
teas such mistake as to allow her to overcome the
finality of a ,judgment. In the present case plaintiff alleged that she and her attorney relied exclusively on her husband's representations that
the shares in question were his separate property
and that her attorney made no examination or
investigation to ascertain whether the shares were
emnmunity property. She did not allege that her
attorney intentionally failed to protect her interests. Plaintiff is barred from obtaining equitable
relief by her admission that she and her attorney
did not investigate the facts, choosing instead to
rely on the statements of the husband as to what
part of the disclosed property was community
property." (Emphasis added.)
In our case, too, the assets were disclosed and the
dispute was as to whether property was conveyed with
fraudulent intent or for other purposes.
If Lucy had been removed as executrix, and Vera
had established her claim at law, and a new personal
representative had brought action against Lucy to recover property conveyed by Dr. Callister during his
lifetime, there would have been no fiduciary relationship
between Lucy and the new personal representative, and
no duty to disclose evidence which might tend to weaken
Lucy's defense. The situation should be no different
because era decided to get a lawyer and enforce her
claim for herself.

'r
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IV
A PROCEEDING TO SET ASIDE A
JUDGMENT AND RELEASE IS AN EQUITABLE ACTION, AND THERE WERE TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT UPON WHICI-I
THE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO RELIEF
WAS DEPENDENT.
Proof of fraud requires "clear and convincing" evidence of the various elements of fraud. Ferrell v. Wiswell., 45 Utah 202, 143 Pac. 582. Vera was required to
prove the representation or concealment of a material
fact, its falsity or the fraudulent character of the concealment, reliance, knowledge that the complaining
party was relying upon the stated fact or non-existence
of the concealed fact, and resulting damage. See In Re
Madsen~s Estate~ 123 Utah 327, 259 P.2d 595, 606.
Although Lucy had not disclosed to Vera that Dr.
Callister had made the statement referred to in the affidavit to the Tax Commission, there is evidence from
which it could be found that there was no reliance upon
the failure to disclose and no damage because of the
failure, that the statement by Dr. Callister was not
material, and that Lucy had no intention to mislead
Vera by not disclosing the fact.
In light of the depositions taken in the two actions,
Vera's affidavit is not sufficient to support a swnmary
judgment. As pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Sartor v. Arkansas National Gas Corp.}
321 U.S. 620, 628, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967, 973, a
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summary judgtnent should not be used to withdraw
witnesses from cross examination, "the best method yet
devised for testing trustworthiness of testimony. And
their credibility and the weight to be given to their
opinions is to be determined, after trial, in the regular
manner." And, as said in Sonnentheil v. Christian Moer/ein Brewing Co., 172 U.S. 401, 408, 43 L.Ed. 492, 495,
1~) S.Ct. t33, "the mere fact that the witness is interested
in the result of the suit is deemed sufficient to require
the credibility of his testimony to be submitted to the
jury as a question of fact."
~Ir.

Beless admits that he knew of Lucy's affidavit
to the Tax Commission in late March or early April,
1963. But he took no prompt action to disaffirm the compromise and settlement. despite his knowledge that Lucy
was involved in attempting to settle a tax claim the
validity of which would depend upon an intention on
Dr. Callister's part inconsistent with the intention
averred by Vera to be true in her previous action against
Lucy, and to be averred in her present one. Such
conduct may estop Vera from obtaining rescission. See
31 C.J .S., Estoppel, §98. Estoppel is aquestion of fact,
and, the issue having been made known to the trial judge
(R. 55), it should not have been determined by summary
judgment.
Related to estoppel is a rule that one who seeks
to cancel an instrument on the ground of fraud must,
upon learning of the fraud, immediately make his decision as to whether to stand on the agreement or renounce
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it and must thereafter continue firm in that purpose.
Taylor v. Moore et al.~ 87 Utah 493, 51 P.2d 222; LeVine et al. v. Whitehouse et al.~ 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac.
2; 12 C.J.S., Cancellation of Instruments~ §38, p. 999.
The reasonableness of the delay and the timeliness
of action to rescind are fact questions. See Union Pacific
Railway Co. v. Whitney (8 Cir.) 198 Fed. 784; Graham
v. Atchison Topeka ~ Santa Fe R. Co.~ (9 Cir.) 176
F.2d 819; Brown v. Hassenstab~ 212 Or. 246, 319 P.2d
929; Althoff v. St. Louis Transit Co.~ 204 Mo. 166, 102
s.w. 642.
Then there is the question of Vera's "clean hands"
in negotiation of the settlement. Her counsel's letter of
September 26, 1962, was sent (if he is to be believed)
after he had come to the conclusion that Dr. Callister
transferred the property without intent to defraud. Yet
he suggested to Lucy that a settlement could be to her
advantage because it would lead the tax authorities to
believe that the transfers were made with the intention
of defrauding {';;%r, rather than in contemplation of
death. The main difference in what Mr. Beless suggested
and what happened was that the amount paid to Vera
was less than what he asked for. The letter of September
26, 1962, was a sha1neless invitation to Lucy to commit
fraud upon the government by trying to convince the
government the facts were different from what they
believed them to be. 8
8 "Shameless" on their part-not on Lucy's. Lucy had conten~ed
all along that she didn't know what Dr. Callister's "actu~l. mtent" was. This was still her attitude before the Tax Commission.
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t:ndcr these circumstances a court of equity (as
fact tinder. not via summary adjudication) could find
that Vera did not con1e into the case with clean hands,
nnd that Lucy did no more than what Vera had invited
her to do, in which case relief would be denied. See
Delgado v. Delgado, 42 N.M. 582, 82 P.2d 909; and
:w C.J .S., Equity, §93.

v
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REIXSTATING 'l'HE PREVIOUS ACTION
.\~D SHOULD HAVE REQUIRED THE
PLAINTIFF TO INITIATE A NEW ACTION AGAINST THE ESTATE OF ALFRED CYRIL CALLISTER, DECEASED.
It is generally held that in equitable actions to
enjoin the enforcement of a judgment the relief is
limited to prohibiting the party from enforcing the
judgment, and that a court of equity may not order a
new trial of the law action. Idaho Globe Dredging Corp.
v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 60 Idaho 127, 90 P.2d
688. This procedural rule is important in this case because of obligations imposed upon the plaintiff by 75-9-9
U.C'.A. 1953, which provides that action on a rejected
claim must be brought within three months after the
filing of the notice of rejection.
'Ve recognize that the period within which the
claimant would be entitled to bring her action frequently
would be affected by existence of the action which was
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dismissed with prejudice, and that Lucy might not be
permitted to contend that the limitation period expired
while the other case was pending. lVe do believe, however, on authority of Free v. Farnsworth et al.~ 112 Utah
410, 188 Pac. 731, that when Vera went into equity
to prevent the enforcement of the judgment she impliedly consented that if the judgment was improperly
granted, Lucy should not be placed at a disadvantage
by reason of the delay.
Here there was a delay after Vera learned all the
facts-or was charged with knowledge of them-in late
March or early April, 1963. She failed to take any action
with respect to the judgment for a period in excess of
the limitation period prescribed by 75-9-9.
Her obligation to bring the revived action within
the time specified by statute is a matter that should be
considered by the trial court, but which probably cannot
be considered because of the character of the trial court's
order. Even if Vera may be able to establish some reasons
why the limitation would not apply, it is a matter upon
which Lucy ought to be heard.
CONCLUSION
In this case, notwithstanding personal ill-will, reliance upon counsel's professional judgment, arm's length
dealings, and access to court processes for determination
of facts, the trial court has ruled as a matter of law that
an executrix even though sued in her individual capacity
for conduct antedating the death of her testator, has a
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duty voluntarily to disclose to her adversary any evidence which tnight, if admitted at the trial, tend to prejudice the executrix's defense, and that the duty encompnsses disclosure of confidential communications between
husband and wife.
~loreover,

the trial court made this "rnatter of law"
ruling notwithstanding the existence of the following
problems:

(1} "\pplication of the doctrine of clean hands.
(:!) ,~era's admission that she relied on her counsel
and her counsel's admission that he recommended settlement upon his professional judgment as to difficulties
of proof. and so that "two mean-mad women" wouldn't
be in court at the same time and the same place.

(3) Failure of Vera and her counsel to seek rescission notwithstanding knowledge of the affidavit, and
knowledge that the Tax Commission and Lucy were
trying to settle the tax issue.
( 4) The "undisclosed facts" were evidential only,

and related to an ultimate fact that was at issue in the
first action.itt iliSiiSue in tlli lawsait.
( 5) Y era had not qualified as a creditor either by

haYing her claim allowed or by reducing it to judgment.
(6) Vera had renounced any confidential relation-

ship between her and Lucy by employing counsel and
bringing an action in which she alleged that Lucy was
a part of a fraudulent scheme and had received trans-
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fers of property to aid and abet Dr. Callister in defrauding her.
In the final analysis, the history of the first action
belies Vera's claim in the second. Although she says
(R. 3) she was induced to execute the stipulation and
release because of her reliance on Lucy's representations,
the question of the "actual intent" of Dr. Callister had
been decided against her in the pre-trial order; and she
didn't even begin to negotiate for settlement until her
chance of winning the suit had all but evaporated.
It's almost as reasonable to suppose that she anticipated the tax controversy and settled to mark time
while her adversary developed evidence for her.
There was no fraud nor fraudulent concealmentand there is no right to relief.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
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APPENDIX ''A''
James W. Beless, Jr.
Attorney at Law
914 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

September 26, 1962
Mr. Bryce Roe

~

Attorney at Law

!:

Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

I

Re: Vera T. Callister v.
Lucy C. Callister, et al

Dear Bry:
I have done a little figuring on death taxes in A. C. Callister's
estate, using the $202,000 taxable estate for both the Federal Estate
Tax and the State Inheritance Tax. You might have Ralph Miller check
~ me out on these.
With the stocks included in the $202,000 as gifts in contemplation
of death, and using the full marital deduction, I compute a Federal
T.tx of S15,100. Likewise, in computing the State Inheritance Tax,
with $40,000 deduction for the joint tenancy property, I compute a
tax of $9,250. Thus, total death taxes of $24,350.00.
~
If the stocks are not included in the taxable estate, the Federal
~l taxable estate would be $105,000, and there would be no Federal
Estate Tax, using the marital deduction. The State Inheritance Tax
:'- would be $1,250.00.
:.

1

The savings in death taxes, if the stocks are not included as
, : gifts in contemplation of death, this amounts to $23,100.
It would appear to me that Mrs. Lucy Callister should seriously
consider this tJx saving, as she would save the difference between
what she would pay Vera Callister and $23,100.00.
Very truly yours,
James W. Beless, Jr.

JWB;b
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APPENDIX "B"
AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
LUCY CALLISTER, after being placed on oath, deposes and says:
That she is the widow of Dr. A. Cyril Callister, who died on the
9th day of February, 1961.
That during the period of time from March through November
of 1959, Dr. Callister transferred certain stocks from his name to the
dt!!.f:'•'tr:r~,. 1s dependeqf s name which stocks were listed on the inheritance tax
report and appraisment under the title "Transfers made within three
years of date of death";
That her husband told her that the transfers were made for the
purpose of removing these stocks from his name and placing them
beyond access of his former wife, Vera Callister, to whom the doctor
owed certain monies for arrearages in an alimony judgment which she
had against him;
That the doctor was very bitter about having to pay this alimony
because he felt that his former wife had received more than her fair
share of the property upon their divorce;
That the doctor considered himself to be in good health at least
until June of 1960 and that he maintained his clinic, and a nurse
until about this time and engaged in the practice of medicine;
And that on or about June of 1960 he retired from the medical
practice and converted the clinic into a nursing home.
Lucy Callister
Subscribed and sworn to this 30th day of December, 1962.
Ralph H. Miller
Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My commission expires: 3-22-64.
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